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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it presents a model examining the 
school choice processes of disadvantaged households accessing the LFP sector in a study on 
Lucknow District, Uttar Pradesh. The model presents households in the study as engaging in 
‘active choice’. Active choice is seen as the deliberated action of households in making 
concerted choices about their children’s schooling through a complex process. The process 
involved assessing competing school sectors (mainly the state and LFP), and analyzing 
particular household circumstances and local school markets through a systemic set of 
values, beliefs, and “mental models” (North, 1990) about education. Second, it focuses on 
the adept employment of engagement strategies specific to the LFP sector by households in 
the study to interact with their chosen schools. Since the schooling arena is heavily 
marketised, household behavior was expected to follow Hirschman’s (1970) classic “exit, 
voice, and loyalty” framework. However, contextual specificities of the LFP sector 
necessitated a re-examination of this framework when applied here. 
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SETTING THE SCENE 
Reported deterioration in the quality of public schooling in many economically 
developing countries has resulted in increased private provision (De, Majumdar, 
Noronha & Samson, 2002; Glick & Sahn, 2006; Tooley & Dixon, 2005). Especially 
striking is that increasing marketisation and privatization are not limited to changes in 
schooling provision for middle or elite classes, but in an increasing number of countries, 
are leading to the emergence of private schools for lower income groups (e.g. Alderman, 
Orazem & Paterno, 2000; Bangay, 2005; Tooley & Dixon, forthcoming; Rose, 2005). The 
mushrooming of what have been termed here, ‘low-fee private’ (LFP) schools in India for 
socially and economically disadvantaged groups is one such phenomenon. Its significance 
as a private sector targeted to a clientele with traditionally low participation in schooling 
is crucial in understanding the changing schooling choices of a group that has been 
marginalized in dominant educational research.  
This study takes its cue from Stromquist’s (1999) call for in-depth analyses of 
how schooling decisions are made within households, since it is the primary site affecting 
educational access. While the heterogeneity of private schooling in India has been noted 
(Aggarwal, 2000; De et al., 2002; Majumdar & Vaidyanathan, 1995; Tilak & Sudarshan, 
2001; Tooley & Dixon, 2005), there is a dearth of research on the household schooling 
behaviors of disadvantaged groups who access the LFP sector. Balagopalan (2004) 
stresses that underpinning Indian educational discourse are the middle classes’ ideological 
constructions of disadvantaged communities favoring child labor over schooling. Such 
rhetoric portrays these groups either as “vulnerable” and likely to be “duped” by LFP 
schools (Singh, 1995), or as “irresponsible” (e.g. Banerji, 2003; Government of India, 
2002, p. 86). From this perspective, disadvantaged groups are characterized as 
disinterested in schooling, ignorant of its benefits and, when faced with limited resources, 
unwilling to send their children to school.  
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Within this context, the purpose of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, it presents a 
model examining the school choice processes of disadvantaged households accessing the 
LFP sector in a study on Lucknow District, Uttar Pradesh. The model presents 
households in the study as engaging in ‘active choice’. Active choice is seen as the 
deliberated action of households in making concerted choices about their children’s 
schooling through a complex process. The process involved assessing competing school 
sectors (mainly the state and LFP), and analyzing particular household circumstances and 
local school markets through a systemic set of values, beliefs, and “mental models” (North, 
1990) about education.  
Secondly, it focuses on the adept employment of engagement strategies specific 
to the LFP sector by households in the study to interact with their chosen schools. Since 
the schooling arena is heavily marketised, household behavior was expected to follow 
Hirschman’s (1970) classic “exit, voice, and loyalty” framework. However, contextual 
specificities of the LFP sector necessitated a re-examination of this framework when 
applied here.  
Following a presentation of the research strategy, the paper reframes the context 
for LFP school choice in India, presents the school choice model for households in the 
study, and outlines the engagement strategies they used to interact with chosen LFP 
schools.  
 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Uttar Pradesh is classed as one of the most “educationally backward” states in 
India, with a literacy rate of 57.4%, placing it 31st of 35 states and territories 
(Government of India, 2001). At the same time, it is estimated to have the second 
highest distribution of private school enrolments in elementary education in the country 
at 57.6% (Panchamukhi & Mehrotra, 2005, p. 236). Despite its reported pervasiveness 
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(Aggarwal, 2000; De et al., 2002; Majumdar & Vaidyanathan, 1995; Tooley & Dixon, 
2005), the new private sector accessed by disadvantaged groups has neither been 
officially defined by the state nor operationally defined by researchers.  
For the purposes of this study, the LFP sector was defined as occupying a part 
(often unrecognized) of the highly heterogeneous private unaided sector1. LFP schools 
were further defined as those that: saw themselves targeting disadvantaged groups, were 
entirely self-financing through tuition fees, and charged a monthly tuition fee not 
exceeding about one day’s earnings of a daily wage laborer at the primary and junior 
(elementary) levels, and about two days’ earnings at the high school and intermediate 
(secondary) levels. 
 Data collection roughly spanned one school-year, and was conducted from July 
2002 to April 2003. Household-level results presented here are part of a larger 
household, school, and state level case study on LFP schooling in Lucknow District 
(Srivastava, 2005; 2006). The specific methods for data collection and sources of 
evidence at the household level are presented below.  
 
Focus Schools 
One urban and one rural focus school was chosen from the 10 case study schools 
(five urban and five rural) for more concentrated ethnographic-style study. Focus schools 
were chosen on the basis that they were deemed to be the best competitors of each 
group; having secured the largest enrolments and facing direct competition from multiple 
LFP and state schools in their immediate vicinity. At the household level, the rationale 
was that focus schools would provide a pool of household interviewees who could best 
articulate their decisions about private schooling, perceptions of their chosen school, and 
why that school was chosen over competing ones. 
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Interviews 
Household 
Data presented here were collected through semi-structured interviews with 60 
parents (or close family members where appropriate), 30 each from the two focus LFP 
schools. Household interviews were conducted by the researcher in Hindi on school 
premises in a private area, and lasted 30-45 minutes. The interview schedule comprised 
questions on: household socio-economic background, family composition, and 
educational profiles; factors influencing choice and decision-making processes regarding 
private schooling; perceptions about chosen schools; and the level of school-
responsiveness and voice at the school. Questions on household and educational profiles 
were structured, which allowed the collection of quantitative data about participants. 
These data were used to better contextualize interviewees’ responses as a group and 
identify schooling patterns within it. 
 
School 
The 10 formal school interviews informing results at the household level were 
the second of three sets of interviews with each school. The interviews of interest here 
addressed schools’ assessments of the educational needs of their target group, strategies 
for responsiveness, and parental participation (school strategies; perceptions of 
involvement). They were conducted in Hindi by the researcher on school premises and 
averaged at 60 minutes.  
Numerous informal interviews were conducted throughout the 10-month period 
with owners/principals to reduce the “artificiality” of formal interview settings 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 140). They provided the opportunity to follow-up on 
observation events or formal interviews over time, and in an atmosphere where 
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owners/principals were more comfortable in giving details on privileged or sensitive 
information (e.g. school income), or as a forum to elaborate on their thoughts.   
 
Non-Participant Observation 
Data on household engagement strategies were further collected through school 
observations of parent-owner/principal interactions over the 10-month period. 
Observations for this purpose were primarily conducted at focus schools in the 
principal’s office during the break between shifts in the urban school, and near the end of 
the school day at the rural school. These were the times when and “social places” 
(Simpson & Tuson, 1995, p. 23) where parents most commonly approached schools. 
 
School Documents 
Student records and documents on information dissemination to parents were 
analyzed. These included attendance and enrolment records, letters or notices to parents, 
and school diaries. 
 
REFRAMING SCHOOL CHOICE FOR THE INDIAN CONTEXT 
There is a need to contextualize school markets (Waslander & Thrupp, 1997), 
and frame the overall institutional parameters within which choice is operating in India. 
Firstly, unlike the USA or UK, school choice as a “policy that is designed to reduce the 
constraints that current school configurations place on schools and students” 
(Goldhaber, 1999, p. 16), is not applicable. This is because the system of catchments 
dictating public school allocation does not exist in principle, however, it may be that 
most parents who send their children to state schools do so based on distance. 
According to most State and Central Government regulations, most government schools 
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are not to deny admission to any child who wishes to be enrolled.2 Therefore, in 
principle, parents have a choice of which school to access. 
Secondly, similar to the USA and UK where privileged parents have had the 
freedom to choose private schooling for their children (Ball, 2003; Gewirtz, Ball, & 
Bowe, 1995; Golhaber, 1999; Power, Edwards, Whitty, & Wigfall, 2003), the same has 
long existed for the upper middle class and elite in India. However, the use of private 
schooling by parents from lower middle-class and disadvantaged groups marks the need 
to examine changing school choice behaviors. The change seems to be linked, at least 
partly, to an increase in the heterogeneity of private schooling provision by fee level 
(Srivastava, 2006; Tilak & Sudarshan, 2001). Thus, new analyses on disadvantaged 
households’ schooling behaviors should focus on choices between the public and private 
sectors among this group. 
Finally, increased choice for disadvantaged groups does not come from voucher 
programs as in some countries (e.g. Chile) or the alleviation of catchment rules in others 
(e.g. USA or UK), but from increased private provision. As Carnoy (2000) notes: “When 
choice is about privatization, we need to know much more about how such an 
educational system would look” (p. 15). In effect, school choice in the current Indian 
context must be analyzed through a distinction of different choice systems.  
The distinction between what Tooley (1997) describes as “choices”, the system 
where parental choice exists within heavy state regulations, funding, and school 
provision; or “choicem”, choice between competing suppliers, with an opening of the 
supply-side reducing state monopoly in supply and funding, can be useful here. 
According to results of this study, even though LFP schools (like other private unaided 
schools), were heavily regulated in principle and should have activated the system of 
choices, in practice, it was enacted through choicem even for disadvantaged groups. That 
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is, LFP school choice is operating within a rapidly expanding array of private schools that 
are independent of state funding and management, and operate through their own 
informal set of rules and operational mechanisms (see Srivastava, 2007). However, 
current understandings of school choice in India have not yet incorporated this changing 
context. 
 
Mind the Gap: Current Understandings of School Choice 
Much of the literature on school choice has been developed in economically 
advantaged countries (e.g. Belfield & Levin, 2005; Fusarelli, 2003; Gewirtz et al., 1995; 
Power et al., 2003; Waslander & Thrupp, 1997). This makes it difficult to analyze the 
private school choices of traditionally excluded groups in economically developing 
countries. Apart from studies on voucher programs (Gauri & Vawda, 2004; McEwan & 
Carnoy, 2000; Mizala & Romaguera, 2000) less relevant to public/private sector school 
choice in the absence of government programs or private subsidies, literature on school 
choice in economically developing countries is limited (e.g. Alderman et al., 2001; 
Glewwe & Jacoby, 1994; Glick & Sahn, 2006), particularly in the private sector.  
The majority of existing literature on private schooling in economically 
developing countries examines the public-private mix of provision and delivery (Jimenez, 
Lockheed, & Wattanawaha, 1988; Jimenez, Lockheed, Luna, & Paqueo, 1989; James, 
1993; James, King, & Suryadi, 1996), comparative achievement (Cox & Jimenez, 1991; 
Jimenez, Lockheed, & Paqueo, 1991; Kingdon, 1996), or educational expenditure and 
financing (Ebel, 1991; Bray, 1996; Patrinos & Ariasingam, 1997). More recently, some 
studies in the Indian context have contemplated the possibility of the private sector 
meeting increased educational demand in view of Education for All goals (De et. al, 2002; 
Mehrotra et al., 2005; Tilak & Sudarshan, 2001). However, a serious engagement with the 
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concept of ‘school choice’ is lacking in the academic discourse of economically 
developing countries.  
In its starkest form, choice in the context of individualism and liberal market 
reforms is based on an extension of the concept of homo economicus, conceiving of the 
parent as a rational thinking individual operating in an ‘open’ education system for self-
interest. In their critique, David, Davies, Edwards, Reay, and Standing (1997) outline that 
choice, from this perspective, can be thought to involve various rational stages which are 
applied to the selection of a school:  
(1) possibilities are identified and separated out as ‘different’ and distinctive 
from one another; 
 
(2) information is acquired about each different option so that they can be 
evaluated one against another, and against previously held criteria; and 
 
(3) this rational appraisal leads to the selection of one option as the ‘choice’ (p. 
399). 
 
Of course, choice is a much more complicated process. Studies in the USA and 
the UK have examined complications in choice-making arising from issues such as 
incomplete information (e.g. Schneider & Buckley, 2002; Schneider, Teske & Marschall, 
2000); confounding race and class factors (e.g. Henig, Hula, Orr, & Pedescleaux, 1999; 
Gewirtz et al., 1995; Tedin & Weihr, 2004; Wells & Serna, 1996); and different political 
contexts and choice programs (Belfield & Levin, 2005; Fusarelli, 2003; Whitty, Power, & 
Halpin, 1998). However, the current analytic on household decision-making processes 
and schooling choices of disadvantaged parents in economically developing countries 
lacks serious engagement of these and other potentially relevant issues. 
 For instance, a much cited study on school choice in Ghana (Glewwe & Jacoby, 
1994) showed that higher quality schools (regarding certain school characteristics) were 
attractive to parents. The researchers reported that repairing leaking classrooms 
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produced the greatest increase in test scores, but investments in school libraries or 
reducing travel time by building more schools yielded only modest increases. They 
explained this seemingly contra-intuitive result by stating that: “If parents choose schools 
based on their attributes, then these attributes are endogenous in an educational 
production function; any positive choice association between school quality and 
cognitive skills…may simply be due to the fact that more motivated students go to better 
schools” (Glewwe & Jacoby, 1994, p. 844). However, as Lloyd, Mensch and Clark (2000) 
astutely note, such analyses ignore “…those aspects of schooling that are most conducive 
to encouraging initial enrolment and retention” (p. 113). 
 Households in this study chose LFP schools partly on their assessments of what 
constituted ‘good schools’ on indicators which were sometimes contrary to accepted 
educational research. For example, large class sizes in LFP schools were often cited as an 
indicator of good schooling because, to these households, they indicated school 
popularity. Household participants interpreted this as a sign that schooling must be 
‘good’, which encouraged both initial enrolment and retention in a particular LFP school. 
Thus, it could be that in the Ghanaian case above, fixing a leaky roof had more impact 
on achievement not (only) because more motivated students went to better schools, but 
because it motivated greater retention or enrolment by targeting a measure of quality in 
that school type that parents perceived to be important. Such examples may point to the 
endogenous nature of school choice, not only in achievement, but in initial enrolment 
and retention related to perceived quality.  
In Alderman et al.’s (2001) study on public/private schooling choices of low-
income households in Pakistan, 37 percent of children were enrolled in private schools 
among families in the lowest income bracket (less than Rs. 2000/month) surveyed in 
Lahore. Of all children in that income bracket, a slightly higher proportion of girls was 
enrolled in private schools (37 percent) compared to boys (35 percent). They contend 
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that schooling choices of poor parents are affected by fee level, school proximity, and 
quality. However, Alderman et al. do not examine the process households followed to 
arrive at this contra-intuitive finding, or how parents interacted with their chosen school 
to maintain or later change that choice. Similarly, in their study on Madagascar, Glick & 
Sahn (2006) find that school choice was related to quality and negatively to multi-grade 
teaching and poor facilities, but there is no analysis on household choice processes.  
Although such studies provide a useful starting point for outlining potential 
factors influencing resulting school choices, they fall short of analyzing the processes 
through which schooling decisions are made within households, and further, how 
households interact with their chosen schools once the choice is made. The analysis here 
aims to fill that gap from a different starting point.  
 Apple (2004) reminds us that the focus on school choice should be more 
comprehensive to include “a systemic quality, a set of values, skills, dispositions, and 
propensities that enables certain groups to employ educational reforms for their own and 
individual collective benefit” (p. 396). Approaching the analysis of disadvantaged groups 
and their engagement with private schooling in this manner allows one to ask the 
question: ‘Is there a systemic set specific to disadvantaged groups in India allowing them 
to employ LFP schooling for their individual and collective benefit, and if so how does it 
work?’ The engagement of disadvantaged groups with the newly emerging LFP sector 
underscores the need to examine results in this study from such a perspective, and to 
ascertain whether, like middle-class parents in the UK or socially advantaged groups in 
the USA, they too are able to extract some benefit. It necessarily enables the conception 
of disadvantaged groups accessing the LFP sector as potentially active agents in their 
children’s schooling rather than as passive bystanders. 
Households in this study chose LFP focus schools through ideological constructs 
related to their “mental models” discussed at length elsewhere (Srivastava, 2006). North 
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(1990) defines mental models as the “pre-existing mental constructs through which they 
[actors] understand the environment and solve the problems they confront” (p. 20), 
which are essential to choice-making behavior. The mental models of parents in this 
study were tied to their beliefs and values about education, perceptions of the different 
school sectors accessible to them, aspirations for their children’s futures, and economic 
concerns.  
Their choice processes were also related to the particular socio-economic 
positions that participating households occupied in relation to local school markets. 
Households in the study viewed the schooling arena as highly marketised, one where 
every social group “has its place”, and saw the LFP sector targeted to them (Srivastava, 
2007). Though deeply considered and systematic, results indicate that their school choice 
process was not ordered or linear and, very often, the resulting choice of school was not 
seen as the ‘best’ or a permanent choice, but a workable proposition at that moment in 
time. An in-depth examination of the school choice processes of participating 
households follows a brief presentation of their profiles.  
 
HOUSEHOLD PROFILES 
Profiles of households in the study are presented in Table 1 in an attempt to 
understand where they placed in relation to different forms of (dis)advantage: caste, 
income, occupation, and education level. The majority of households fell under at least 
one (but generally multiple) forms of (dis)advantage, as well as within the focus schools’ 
intended target group. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
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The majority (88%) of the 181 school-aged children in participating households were 
sent to focus and other LFP schools. The remaining school-aged children went to state 
(8%) and religious (1%) schools, while 3% were out of school. The most popular choice 
for households in the study was LFP focus schools, which is undoubtedly related to the 
fact that all interviewees were from the focus schools themselves. However, what was 
surprising was the extent to which focus schools were accessed.  
Given their limited financial resources and low educational status, the assumption 
was that households in the study would be selective and access the private sector for one 
child (probably male) (e.g. De et al., 2002; PROBE, 1999; Tilak & Sudarshan, 2001). 
However, these households chose LFP focus schools for almost all (83%) of their 
school-aged children; urban households sending 2.35 and rural households sending 2.6 
school-aged children to their respective focus school. Furthermore (and surprisingly), 
they were just as likely to send their daughters to LFP schools as their sons (see 
Srivastava, 2006 for gender analysis). These findings were not intended to be generalized 
but to contextualize LFP school choice for households in the study. Given that this was 
one of the first studies expressly examining LFP school choice processes of 
disadvantaged groups in India, the results above provide a contra-intuitive context from 
which to examine the school choice processes of households in the study. 
 
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF LFP SCHOOL CHOICE 
Data indicated that there were prerequisites for school choice, or certain 
necessary conditions that had to exist for households in the study to make the initial 
choice to send their children to school at all. These are discussed at length elsewhere 
(Srivastava, 2006) but can be broadly categorized as: (a) infrastructure (mixed school pool 
of school types and safe access to school) and (b) prioritizing education (ability to 
prioritize and mental model shifts). The choice between available sectors and the choice 
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of a particular LFP school were intertwined with them. In effect, the prerequisites 
pointed to systemic barriers that may have traditionally blocked disadvantaged 
households from accessing schooling (e.g. Karlekar, 2000).   
To reiterate, the resulting model presents households in the study with mental 
models favoring the LFP sector through a systemic set of values, beliefs, and perceptions 
about education, the nature of provision in the two main sectors accessible to them (state 
and LFP), aspirations for their children, and economic concerns. Choosing LFP schools 
was particularly significant given households’ very limited finances, low education levels, 
and relative inexperience with formal schooling. Results indicated that households 
engaged in a dynamic and inter-related process structured by the macro-level attitudinal 
factors, ‘perceptions about state and private sectors’ and ‘beliefs about education and LFP 
schooling’, and the micro-level contextual factors, ‘information about local school 
characteristics’ and ‘constraints’ (see Figure 1). For participants, choosing the LFP sector 
was a multi-faceted process—choosing LFP focus schools was not the automatic result 
of choosing between available state and LFP schools. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Having made the prerequisite choice to send their children to school, there were 
two inter-related levels of choice for the purposes of the study: (1) a macro-level choice 
of school type: the choice between different sectors (most commonly, state and LFP) 
and (2) a micro-level choice of specific school: the choice between competing schools in 
local school markets. While there seemed to be some correlation between the two levels 
(beyond the scope of the study to ascertain), choosing one sector over the other at a 
macro-level did not necessarily exclude selecting a school from the other sector, given 
micro-level assessments of local school markets or constraints. For example, while a 
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minority, 13 households simultaneously accessed LFP schools and state, religious, or no 
schools for some of their school-aged children. In effect, the macro-level almost acted as 
an umbrella through which households took stock of their specific situations, contexts, 
and needs. The discussion on engagement strategies further below will show that they did 
not view resulting choices as final and re-evaluated them within a school year. 
 
Macro-Level Attitudinal Factors 
Perceptions about the State and Private Sectors  
 Participants held firm macro-level perceptions about state and private sectors, 
which were applied to their local contexts in choosing a school. Similar to other studies 
(Govinda, 2002; Jeffrey, Jeffrey, & Jeffrey, 2005; PROBE, 1999), households generally 
viewed both sectors as binary opposites, with all private schooling types offering a better 
quality (however defined) of schooling. One rural father stressed:   
The difference between here [the private sector] and there [the state sector] 
is like that between the ground and the sky.  –Ram Dev3 
 
Similar to Ram Dev, many parents asserted that there was “something” 
inherently different about private sectors that the state sector simply could not match. 
This somewhat intangible set of qualities was a combination of parents sensing a more 
conducive climate for schooling and more educational activities in private schools. 
Interviewees perceived differences between the state and private sectors as deficiencies in 
the former. They perceived these deficiencies mostly due to the general discourse on 
schooling in their local communities, and in some cases, through personal experience of 
both sectors.  
Deficiencies in the state sector were attributed to a number of school-related 
factors, such as: lack of adequate school facilities; short-staffing of teachers; unsanctioned 
school closures and irregular school staff attendance; inadequate or infrequent 
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monitoring or school inspections; lack of strict disciplinary procedures for children; an 
unsupportive and non-responsive school environment for parents; and unreliable 
teachers and unsatisfactory teaching practices. There is converging evidence in existing 
literature on many of these points (e.g. Balagopalan & Subrahamanian, 2003; Jabbi & 
Rajyalaskshmi. 2000; Nambissan & Sedwal, 2001; PROBE, 1999).  
Household perceptions about differences between the state and LFP sectors were 
most deeply ascribed to the attitudes and work practices of teachers, which were largely 
conceived as negligent and dubious. Many viewed state teachers and their teaching 
practices with disdain. In more extreme cases, some households expressed a heightened 
lack of confidence in the state sector, dismissing it as being gravely malfunctioning and 
rampant of corruption. Among this group, parents (and LFP owners) made allegations 
that state inspectors did not make regular inspections or accepted ghoos (bribes) to pass 
malfunctioning schools (similar to findings by Tooley & Dixon, 2005). Nonetheless, 
teachers were blamed as the main culprits, seen as manipulating the state sector by 
resorting to questionable practices such as transferring from remote postings for 
personal motives:   
There’s nothing but deceit and disloyalty in state schools. People sit at home 
and accumulate their pensions. They don’t want to teach. 
[…] 
 
Teachers get their postings transferred locally [from rural schools]. They do their 
household chores… farming and agriculture or business, they do everything. 
They have no interest in teaching. So two or four children from the local area 
go just to hang out, they’re not the studying type…what difference does it 
make? Instead of playing at home they go and play at school. 
 
And here in the city, what’s the situation in the state schools? 
 
…I’ve never seen them. Nor do I have any power to go and visit them. […] 
 
I think that it’ll be approximately the same type of environment here as well. 
 –Alok Kumar, Urban Father 
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Such perceptions about the state sector were deep-rooted and, as for Alok 
Kumar, held even if they were not validated in local contexts. In contrast, the LFP sector 
was generally perceived as being efficient and successful in delivering a satisfactory 
standard of schooling, mainly because for many, fee charging was seen as a prerequisite 
for ‘good’ schooling.  
Generally, perceptions about the LFP sector were: better school facilities; strict 
adherence to school calendars and daily timetables; higher class of clientele; higher levels 
of school responsiveness to specific needs; interested and capable teachers; an 
environment more conducive to learning; better quality of schooling; and effective 
school management. Positive perceptions about the LFP sector were related to a feeling 
that there was some guarantee on the quality of schooling delivered, simply because 
households paid a fee (no matter how low) which contributed to the school’s very 
existence. Some parents felt that paying a fee gave them a right to test the claims made by 
their chosen LFP school, contrary to the state sector. 
Households also felt that children attending LFP schools were brighter. For 
many, this perception was an extension of the belief that private schools were inherently 
better than state schools. For others, it was due to differences in their children’s results 
on various tasks and exams. However, it must be stressed that these perceptions were 
based on school-devised exams or tests and not on comparable or standardized 
measures. Some parents also felt that judging their children’s progress was difficult 
because of their own limited or lack of schooling, Nonetheless, the perception held, and 
the majority of households conceptualized LFP schools as the only viable tools for social 
mobility, and the most tangible opportunity for a better life:  
…I said that it’s been two years since they’ve been studying at the state 
school and they’re not learning anything and their life is being ruined. Big deal 
if they’re going [to school], they’re not learning anything… […] 
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It’s the third year now that they’re at the private [focus] school. And now 
however they do, they’re going to continue studying in private school. At 
least they’ll learn something, they’ll be able to make something of their life.  
–Champa Devi, Urban Mother 
 
Beliefs about Education and LFP Schooling 
 The second attitudinal factor concerned households’ general beliefs about the 
necessity of formal education and its role in their children’s futures. Most households felt 
that traditional trades were no longer sustainable, requiring their children to seek formal 
education for employment in different sectors (see Srivastava, 2006). These beliefs were 
most expressly attached to the LFP sector, where parents perceived the type of education 
required in India’s changing socio-economic context was available. This was despite their 
lack of knowledge about the curriculum, and despite LFP schools in the study rigidly 
following the same curriculum delivered in state schools. Nonetheless, LFP schooling 
was seen as an essential commodity to acquire a place in the new labor market.  
However, they felt that although education (LFP schooling in particular) was 
necessary, it would not guarantee a job. Some attributed that to fate, while others felt that 
nepotism or institutionalized corruption stood in the way:   
There’s no guarantee at all [that they’ll find a job]… even those who’ve 
passed intermediate [grade 12] roam around empty-handed. But having 
been educated they can start their own business or trade. It’s common 
practice to give a Rs. 150,000 bribe to get a job somewhere… even as a bank 
manager or teacher. —Brij Bihari, Rural Father  
 
 Some households felt that the benefits of education were curbed after a certain 
level (junior or high school). For them, the decision to send their children to secondary 
or post-secondary education was pre-empted from the outset, in favor of setting up small 
trades. Similar to Jeffrey et al’s (2005) account of privatization in Uttar Pradesh, this sub-
group of households saw the LFP sector as a commodity, but accessed it for a specific 
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purpose: to educate their children to an adequate standard in the 3 R’s so that they may 
be self-sufficient in the future. 
Beliefs about LFP schooling contributing to self-sufficiency were stressed by 
parents who claimed that their own lack of education underscored the importance of 
schooling their children. They specifically conceptualized LFP schooling as promoting 
self-sufficiency and raising their children’s economic socio-economic status, as well as 
negotiating barriers in everyday life and fostering independence, particularly for their 
daughters. Similar to other studies (e.g. Jeffrey, 2005; Page, 2005), while many parents 
acknowledged that girls’ education was important for employability, the changing 
‘marriage market’ held relatively more importance (Srivastava, 2006). However, parents 
believed that accessing the LFP sector for their daughters would increase social mobility 
by receiving better marriage proposals. In some households, the need for girls’ education 
was contested and choosing the LFP sector was the result of continuous advocacy.  
Both macro-level factors were applied to households’ specific contexts and were 
mediated by the micro-level contextual factors, ‘local school characteristics’ and 
‘constraints’, to choose local LFP focus schools.  
 
Micro-Level Contextual Factors 
Information about Local School Characteristics 
Since there was an adequately sized pool of potentially accessible state and LFP 
schools for rural and urban households to choose from4, focus schools were not chosen 
by default. Household choice processes partly relied on gathering information about 
potential schools on different characteristics, such as: fee structure, fee management 
practices, teachers’ attendance rate, school facilities, school environment, children’s 
results, and medium of instruction. They gathered this information to make a judgment 
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on the relative quality of different local schools according to their own indicators and 
mental models.  
Their primary and overwhelming sources of information were other parents in 
the neighborhood or village, family members, and close friends who were considered 
trustworthy and reasonably informed. The information was largely comprised of their 
sources’ experiences of and general perceptions about focus schools compared with 
other local schools. Except for a small minority of households that visited focus schools 
prior to enrolling their children, or who had some direct knowledge by having previously 
accessed it, most gained something similar to “hot knowledge” (Ball, 2003) by speaking 
to other parents.  
Surprisingly, even though the context and socio-economic status of households 
in this study were vastly different to middle-class parents in England, they seemed to 
engage in similar behavior of “chattering” about schools (Ball, 2003). Data indicate that 
these disadvantaged households engaged in dynamic conversation about local schools, 
actively sought information about them, and called on each other for ‘insider’ knowledge. 
Once the information was collected, it was matched against similar information about 
other local state and LFP schools and linked back to attitudinal factors. In light of the 
information, they conducted a sort of cost-benefit analysis on the perceived quality of 
local schools. For example, even though state schools had the lowest tuition fees and 
despite their incentives (free textbooks, 3 kg wheat per month/child, and scholarships), 
households did not feel that these benefits outweighed the costs of what was thought to 
be an inferior quality of schooling.  
Generally, the level of ‘goodness’ of different school types was perceived to 
increase as fee levels and English instruction increased. For example, Hindi-medium LFP 
schools were perceived to be better than state schools, medium-fee English private 
schools better than Hindi-medium LFP schools, and high-fee English private schools 
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were perceived as the best. Nonetheless, most households felt that given their budget and 
available information on the quality of different schools (according to their conceptions 
of ‘good’ schooling), focus schools were the best ‘value for money’. Most chose LFP 
focus schools not because they were perceived as the ‘best’ overall choice, but because 
they were the most workable and accessible to households in the study. 
Generally, household conceptions of what constituted a ‘good school’ and ‘good 
schooling’ at the macro-level held for the micro-level. The relative ‘goodness’ of focus 
schools was related to certain household-articulated indicators, such as: school popularity 
indicated by large class sizes and high instances of enrolment from local families; 
children’s views on their degree of happiness; the practice of fee-charging; English 
instruction (as a subject even if not English-medium); high promotion rates; good pass 
rates on school tests and Board exams; regular teachers’ attendance; teachers paying 
attention to children in class; strict discipline practices; and local parents’ opinions.   
Valuing large class sizes may partially explain why the urban focus school’s 
reputation grew as a ‘good school’ despite the fact that until 2001, when the school’s 
facilities were extended, average class sizes were 60-70 in cramped conditions. In fact, the 
owner explained that increased revenues due to jumps in enrolment and increased 
popularity during this time enabled expansion. In the urban focus school’s experience, 
stifling conditions and large class sizes prompted even more parents to access it.  
High promotion rates were also an important consideration, since households 
reported that they were the only check they had on the schooling delivered. However, 
other than students who took board exams, all other assessment was school-based and 
there were no external criterion-based assessments that could confirm students’ 
performance. Nonetheless, households did not question whether high promotion rates 
resulted from student mastery of key concepts or lenient grading criteria. In fact, some 
case study schools stated that they adopted lenient promotion policies since lower 
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promotion rates would indicate low learning levels, which would be interpreted by 
current and potential clients as low quality, and adversely affect popularity. Participants 
also stressed that focus schools had certain specific characteristics (see Table 2), 
prompting them to be chosen over competing LFP schools. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Constraints 
Unsurprisingly, practical constraints affected households’ choice of school. While 
financial constraints may have been the most acute and pervasive, there were others (see 
Table 3). Nonetheless, given their limited financial resources, parents explained that this 
was the primary constraint and often a determining factor in deciding which local school 
to access. Households reported that they tried finding a local school that matched as 
many desired school characteristics as possible within their limited budget. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Most of the 13 households that simultaneously accessed focus schools in 
combination with others claimed it was because of financial constraints. In such cases, 
some households opted for state schools based on the presumed aptitude of their 
children. Others, particularly Muslim families, chose lower fee religious schools 
(madrasas). Nonetheless, for most households, focus schools represented a viable option 
with many desirable school characteristics, while allowing them to manage their 
constraints. While most parents were satisfied having chosen focus schools, some were 
concerned that a combination of constraints conspired, restricting their choice to the 
focus school from some ‘ideal’ school. For them, even though certain desirable 
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characteristics were not present in focus schools to the degree that they would have 
ideally liked, the combination of individual constraints outweighed that concern. As 
previously mentioned, a common example was choosing focus schools over medium-fee 
English-medium private schools.   
  Thus, having been guided by macro-level attitudinal factors to favor the LFP 
sector households applied them to their specific contexts through micro-level contextual 
factors, and chose the focus schools for most of their children. However, as the 
following discussion on engagement strategies will demonstrate, this choice was 
continually re-evaluated, and for many, did not represent a final or permanent choice.  
 
HOUSEHOLD ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES: DO EXIT, VOICE, AND 
LOYALTY APPLY? 
 
The increased commodification of schooling in India (Jeffrey et al., 2005) and 
LFP sector choice in particular necessitates an analysis of patterns of interaction with a 
consumer orientation. Hirschman’s (1970) concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty provide a 
starting point for thinking about how the introduction of market forces in schooling 
provision for disadvantaged groups can alter their engagement with the schooling arena. 
Although the concepts were developed to explain customer or member responses to 
declining firms or organizations, Hirschman explicitly intended them to be applied to 
other contexts and frequently used public/private education as an example to illustrate 
client behavior. Therefore, it is surprising that while the concepts are frequently referred 
to as generally accepted patterns of behavior regarding school choice, relatively few 
studies (e.g. Adler & Raab, 1988; Moore, 1990; Willms & Echols, 1992; Matland, 1995; 
Gordon, 1996) as a proportion of the vast school choice literature have actually used 
them as explicit bases of analysis.  
 24 
 According to Hirschman (1970), customers or members are likely to use one of 
two options in response to a decline in the quality of a firm’s product or an 
organization’s service: 
(1) Some customers stop buying the firm’s products or some members leave 
the organization: this is the exit option. As a result, revenues drop, 
membership declines, and management is impelled to search for ways and 
means to correct whatever faults have led to exit. 
 
(2) The firm’s customers or the organization’s members express their 
dissatisfaction directly to the management…through general protest 
addressed to anyone who cares to listen: this is the voice option. As a result, 
management once again engages in a search for the causes and possible 
cures of customers’ and members’ dissatisfaction (emphasis in original) 
(p.4).  
 
 The important distinction is that exit is an economic mechanism and voice, a 
political one. This distinction has been blurred in some studies that equate exiting to 
choice (e.g. Ball, 2003, p. 40). In fact, many studies on school choice operationalize 
‘choosers’ as those that have exited their local public school, requested special 
placements, or participated in voucher programs (e.g. Adler & Raab, 1988; Stevans & 
Sessions, 2002; Willms & Echols, 1992). The problem with such conceptualizations is 
that the political mechanism of voice assumes secondary treatment, and parents who stay 
at their local schools are depicted as ‘non-choosers’ or disinterested without an analysis 
of their reasons for staying at a school. There is little indication whether these parents 
indeed made the choice to stay at a particular school because they were actively engaging 
with voice to make positive changes in it, expressing loyalty, or were what Hirschman 
describes as “inert clients” who are less quality sensitive. 
Loyalty assumes importance in such a discussion. According to Hirschman’s 
(1970) framework: “As a rule…loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice” (p. 28). He 
notes that loyalty is most important for organizations that occupy the bottom tier of a 
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quality spectrum which is densely populated by similar competing organizations. In such 
a scenario, loyalty can act as a barrier for a number of clients that are likely to exit to a 
competitor. This seems particularly applicable to LFP schools which are abundant, in 
fierce competition with one another, and which, in comparative terms, are generally seen 
as lower quality than other schools in the private sector. However, data from this study 
show that schools maintained their client base not by inculcating “loyalty and cohesive 
ideology” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 82), but by actively targeting parents’ financial needs as 
expressed through the engagement strategies they employed. Results indicated that 
parents in this study neither used voice to engage with their LFP school politically nor 
expressed loyalty, but that their immediate concern was to engage economically.  
Resulting engagement strategies were quite different from Hirschman’s accepted 
model. Households used four strategies as part of a spectrum to engage with the LFP 
sector: staying, fee-bargaining, exiting, and fee-jumping depicted in Figure 2. Each strategy 
indicates varying degrees of decreasing nesting at a particular LFP school, where nesting 
refers to the likelihood of staying at a particular school for a significant length of time. In 
light of the analysis, this was set at a minimum of beyond one school year. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Unlike Hirschman’s model, while households exited LFP schools they were only 
somewhat quality sensitive to even their own indicators above. Strategies with greater 
degrees of nesting (such as staying) were not related to the “political mechanism of 
voice” or to loyalty expressed as a commitment to stay. In fact, voice was neither 
employed nor sought in the traditional sense, and the concept of loyalty inculcating 
converging ideologies, was non-existent. As the discussion will show, households 
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established engagement strategies around the “economic mechanism of exit” to an even 
greater degree than in Hirschman’s analysis. 
 
Staying 
The strategy with the highest degree of nesting was termed, staying. It was 
employed by parents who accessed focus schools for at least one year, or who envisioned 
their children to continue at their chosen school in the immediate future. Although it had 
the highest degree of nesting compared to the other strategies, staying did not indicate a 
final choice. For example, it did not preclude the option of exiting if children’s results did 
not match desired outcomes, even in cases where focus schools were accessed for a 
number of years.  
Households expressed a number of rationales behind staying, which are 
presented in Table 4. While much of the rationale was related to positive assessments of 
schools, there were certain instances where it seemed less the result of positive factors.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Staying was sometimes the result of obligation to LFP school owners because of 
personal relationships, or out of a tradition to access certain schools. This feeling of 
obligation was stronger in the rural case. For example:  
…I mean, you send them here [to the rural focus school] and the children that 
studied here and failed high school are the ones teaching. So when they 
themselves don’t have any knowledge, then how are they going to teach? 
That’s why we can see that our children can’t even speak proper Hindi. But 
because it’s not good to keep changing schools… that’s why we’re sending 
them to school here.  –Nandu Ram, rural father 
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Nandu Ram’s comment, “it’s not good to keep changing schools”, was in 
reference to the perceived strain in his relationship with the owner if he exited. While this 
degree of obligation was reported by only one interviewee, it seemed an important 
theoretical distinction as it points to the possibility that staying at a particular school may 
not be automatically due to quality satisfaction. This is contrary to Hirschman’s model 
and traditional market analyses that continually accessing a school is prompted by loyalty 
or voice, or indicates satisfaction (e.g. Chubb & Moe, 1990; Tooley, 2000). The sense of 
personal obligation is not akin to the concept of loyalty in Hirschman’s model, as it 
carries a sense of coercion or unwillingness rather than a commitment to the school.  
Data indicate that the strategy to stay may partly have been the result of certain 
barriers: (1) exhaustion of the local school pool (more acute in rural group); (2) sense of 
obligation to owners; and (3) the belief (though uncommon) that disruption from 
moving children between schools was undesirable. Fundamentally, the analysis highlights 
that staying relied on a mix of rationales and was not necessarily related to quality 
satisfaction, pointing to the apparent unsuitability of homo economicus in this context. 
 
Fee-Bargaining 
It was not uncommon for parents to bargain over the amount of tuition fees due. 
The interaction was not unlike the common practice of bargaining employed by Indian 
consumers for any good in the market. According to observed practice in case study 
schools, parents approached the owner/principal and claimed that they could not afford 
the fees due because of other financial commitments or a lack of earnings. Instead, they 
presented an amount they could afford, and after some haggling, made a final offer. This 
offer was slightly higher than the initial amount but always less than the amount due. 
Nonetheless, owners/principals accepted it, claiming they had no other choice.  
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Households employed fee-bargaining with the intention of staying, but 
threatened to exit if the reduced fee amount was not accepted. LFP school 
owners/principals explained that they conceded to parents’ fee-bargaining instead of 
expelling students for two main reasons: (1) philanthropic motive: claiming it was unfair 
to deny their students schooling on account of their parents’ actions even if they felt 
parents could afford the full amount and (2) profit motive: pressure to retain clients since 
they could easily exit to competing LFP schools.  
Superficially, fee-bargaining can be seen as a sort of voicing strategy. However, it 
has quite a different nature. Voice, in the traditional model, implies that parents take 
action to voice their concerns with the aim of improving school quality for the 
educational benefit of their children. However, fee-bargaining was only used to voice 
financial concerns with the aim of reducing financial commitments. This constitutes a 
fundamental difference between the conceptualization of voice in Hirschman’s model as 
a recuperation mechanism for quality improvement, and here, where it was only used for 
improving crude efficiency. Moving further along the spectrum towards lower degrees of 
nesting makes it clearer that Hirschman’s model was not applicable here.  
 
Exiting 
Households frequently and uninhibitedly employed the strategy to exit LFP 
schools. What is seen as an extreme strategy in traditional school choice literature was 
reportedly used by nearly all participants at some time. Enabling exit was the ease of exit 
and entry in the LFP sector because of the specific operational arrangements that case 
study schools (like other LFP schools) made (Srivastava, 2007). More tangibly, the 
schooling pattern of the household in the following example is indicative of the 
frequency and ease with which exiting was employed.  
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In the span of three years, one urban household accessed three LFP schools: first 
a rural LFP school, then an LFP school in another part of the city, and finally the urban 
focus school. The family did not wait for the end of an academic year to exit a school. In 
fact, the exits corresponded to their relocation plans rather than the school schedule. 
They did not encounter difficulties in enrolling their children in any LFP school, even for 
mid-year enrolments, despite the fact that this was against official enrolment procedures.   
The majority of households reported that focus schools were not the first or only 
schools they had accessed. In fact, although the focus school choice had a higher a 
degree of permanence for most households than previous schools, the decision to exit 
them was not improbable. For example, one household accessed the urban focus school 
for all of its six children for eight consecutive years. Yet, the option to exit it were they 
not satisfied with their children’s grades that year was mentioned as the next immediate 
step. Conversely, households who had previously exited other LFP schools for the focus 
schools expressed similar reasons. Apart from ‘chronic exiters’ who employed fee-jumping 
(below), in which the prime and perhaps only concern was to access LFP schools 
without paying, there was a mix of rationales for households who employed exiting (see 
Table 5). Once again, exiting was not purely a quality sensitive decision as in Hirschman’s 
model. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Fee-Jumping 
LFP clients displaying an extreme lack of likelihood to nest employed the fee-
jumping strategy and were termed ‘chronic exiters’. All LFP owners/principals reported 
that clients frequently exited their schools at the end of a given school year without 
paying a large proportion of fees due. They claimed that parents “jumped on the fees” at 
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their school, enrolling their children in another LFP school. According to 
owners/principals, a certain degree of premeditation was central to this strategy. They 
felt that chronic extiers would have determined from the outset to pay fees for only a few 
initial months and exit at the end of the year. This would be repeated at another LFP 
school the following year. 
The success of this strategy hinged on the admission practices of most LFP 
schools that were contrary to the official rules of admission. The proper course of new 
enrolments was for the new student to submit a valid school record or ‘transfer 
certificate’. However, in practice, many LFP schools admitted students without it. 
Owners/principals asserted that it was advantageous for the admitting LFP school to do 
so. Not only would the school’s enrolment increase, it would also collect admission fees 
(usually double or triple the monthly tuition fee) and at least a few months’ fees. The 
advantage for chronic exiters was that they saved the overdue amount at the old school 
and on the cost of a full year’s fees at the new school. While fee-jumping was the most 
extreme strategy in the spectrum, owners/principals claimed it was not uncommon.  
Owners/principals stressed their powerlessness in dealing with chronic exiters as 
they did not have much bargaining power because: (1) the threat of withholding transfer 
certificates in non-board examined years was futile, having little or no effect on 
admissions to other LFP schools and (2) expelling students was disadvantageous since 
they hoped to recover some fees as long as parents stayed. It is clear that concepts of 
loyalty and voice were non-existent in fee-jumping, and that it was used not as a quality 
recuperation mechanism, but for financial gain.  
 
Factors Contributing to the Success of Engagement Strategies 
The success of household engagement strategies, particularly those with low 
degrees of nesting, lay with the specific nature of the schooling market for disadvantaged 
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groups and its operational arrangements. Firstly, the mushrooming of LFP schools in 
urban and rural areas (although fewer in number) changed the landscape of school choice 
for households that were mainly relegated to one sector—the state. The widespread 
emergence of LFP schools provided disadvantaged households with a viable alternative 
to the perceived (and perhaps actual) deterioration of quality in the state sector for the 
first time. This landmark development allowed them to actively engage in school choice 
by employing strategies that they felt would benefit their interests. 
Secondly, in addition to the increased number and types of accessible schools, the 
LFP sector’s specific operational arrangements (see Srivastava, 2005; 2007) allowed 
households to employ these strategies uninhibitedly, and with little immediate cost to 
their children’s education. For example, if the formal rule for admitting schools requiring 
transfer certificates was not over-ridden by shadow rules allowing admissions without 
them, then households could not employ fee-jumping or exiting with much success. 
Exiting would not result in immediate entry to another school, having a negative cost to 
their children’s schooling, and possibly acting as a deterrent for chronic exiters.  
Finally, while some parents felt that moving children between schools could 
adversely impact their schooling, this was not a barrier for most, even those employing 
the strategy to stay. This facilitated the use of engagement strategies with lower degrees 
of nesting, and partly seemed related to households’ lack of engagement with loyalty or 
voice in the LFP sector. 
 
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS  
It can be said that active school choice behavior is expected in a group that 
directly invested in schooling and chose the LFP sector. However, the results challenge 
traditional assumptions about the schooling choices and behaviors of disadvantaged 
households in India and nuance the discourse. The complexities of the school choice 
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processes and the resulting model in this study point to a systemic set of values, beliefs, 
and mental models which guided these disadvantaged households in enacting their 
school choices and engaging with their chosen schools. Results show that despite their 
relative lack of familiarity with formal schooling, disadvantaged households in the study 
made a deliberate and considered choice, albeit from a different frame of reference. 
Furthermore, they did not assume the role of “disconnected choosers” (Gewirtz et al., 
1995), which would be the expected class-related typology most closely capturing the 
group in this study. Disconnected choosers are defined as parents who:  
…are disconnected from the market in the sense that they are not inclined to 
engage with it. It is not that these parents have no views about education, or 
no concerns about schools and their children’s achievement. They do, but 
they do not see their children’s enjoyment of school or their educational 
success as being facilitated in any way by a consumerist approach to school 
choice (Gewirtz et al., 1995, p. 45).  
Households in this study were in fact convinced that their children’s schooling 
could be improved only through active engagement with the school market and a 
consumerist approach to school choice, rather than relying on state provision. In fact, the 
very nature of the school market facilitated the emergence of an approach to school 
choice more consumerist than many economically developed countries. However, the 
process was structured through ideological mental models, where any one of the 
attitudinal or contextual factors informed the others and could result in reassessing the 
choice. This poses a challenge to rational assumptions about school choice in exactly the 
scenario they are assumed to operate—an exceedingly privatized and marketised school 
arena.  
A picture of households considering the choice through ideological or value-
based constructs and perceptions that can be influenced by peers and changing socio-
economic factors, school popularity and reputation, beliefs about education, aspirations 
for children’s futures, and value-laden perceptions of a failing state sector, emerges. 
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Furthermore, the fee-bargaining and fee-jumping strategies specific to the LFP sector 
(and not other private sectors in India), highlights that the specificities of the contextual 
make-up of particular schooling markets must be considered. Simply implanting client 
strategies developed in other markets is insufficient for an adequate analysis, since 
resulting client strategies to engage with chosen schools are themselves contextually 
derived. 
 Finally, while traditional arguments for greater choice through marketisation 
(resulting from affordable privatization or not) hinge on raising the public sector’s 
efficiency and effectiveness (e.g. Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hoxby, 2003; Tooley, 1997; 2000), 
they do not take into consideration systems where the public sector has no incentive to 
compete. Hirschman’s theory was catalyzed by his observations of the Nigerian railway 
system, which experienced large exit but did not have the mechanism’s desired 
recuperation effect. This was because its revenue sources were diverse and relied more 
heavily on state contributions than private ones. This is strikingly similar to Indian public 
education, which in recent years has received increased funding from international 
sources through Education for All programs without contingencies on quality 
improvement. Therefore, while the emergence of the LFP sector heralds an important 
and perhaps even desirable change for the schooling choices of some disadvantaged 
groups, it also poses a paradox of further deteriorating quality for the public sector, 
because: 
While it is most clearly revealed in the private-public school case, one 
characteristic is crucial…those customers who care most about the quality of 
the product and who, therefore, are those who would be the most active, 
reliable, and creative agents of voice are for that very reason also those who 
are apparently likely to exit first in case of deterioration (Hirschman, 1970, p. 
47). 
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 According to Hirschman’s typology, parents accessing the LFP sector would be 
classified as the quality-conscious “alert clients” in relation to the competing state sector. 
This has fundamental implications for the future of children whose parents either cannot 
or do not access the LFP sector. For if the state sector is as malfunctioning as it is 
perceived and documented to be, and there is cream-skimming of clients even among 
disadvantaged groups, the future of schooling for the most disadvantaged does not seem 
promising. From this perspective, while greater school choice through the LFP sector 
seems desirable for disadvantaged groups who had little or no choice before, it may also 
be highly iniquitous if it has no recuperation effect for the state sector.  
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
1 Private unaided schools are financially independent of the state, and can be recognised or unrecognised. 
This is in contrast to private-aided schools that are privately managed but heavily funded (up to 95 percent 
of a school’s budget) through state grant-in-aid. 
2 There may be some state variations. This does not hold for government schools run by central 
departments for specific groups. For example, a small number of schools are run by the Department of 
Tribal Welfare (for tribal groups), the Ministry of Defence (sainik schools), and Ministry of Social Justice 
(for children with disabilities).  
3 All names are pseudonyms. All interview excerpts are translated from the original in Hindi.  
4 Rural households had a total of six schools (three state and three LFP) they could choose from. Due to 
the large number of LFP schools in the vicinity of the focus school, the size of the urban school pool is 
indeterminate. However, the urban focus school received direct competition from four other LFP schools 
and two state schools on the same block. 
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Table Error! Main Document Only. 
Profiles of Households in the Study 
 
  
Caste 55 percent belonged to Other Backward Caste or Scheduled Caste groups 
(ranked as the lowest official caste groups in India) 
 
Household Income 80 percent earned below the minimum annual taxable income of Rs. 50,000 
Rural mean: Rs. 26,108 (excluding outlier) 
Urban mean: Rs. 41,768  
 
Parents’ Occupation 83 percent Mothers: Housewives (of those who worked all but 3 engaged in 
domestic or manual labour) 
84 percent Fathers: Manual labour, small farming, or low skilled jobs 
 
Parents’ Educational Level 51 percent parents had no formal education or only some primary schooling 
58 percent urban mothers and 53 percent rural mothers: no schooling  
 
School-aged Children per 
Household 
Urban households: 2.87 
Rural households: 3.06 
Note: The sample was not intended to be representative. It constituted 10% of the total number of 
households accessing LFP focus schools. 
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Table 2 
Specific Focus School Characteristics 
 
Focus School Characteristic Participant Articulations 
Fee Concessions Greater fee concessions making focus schools more affordable. 
 
Flexible Fee Collection 
Practices 
More flexibility in the timing and amount of fees to be paid compared to 
other LFP schools in area. 
 
Convenience Location of the school in the centre of the village or neighbourhood and 
proximity to homes. The ability of children to go to school in groups without 
adult escorts. This was seen as a factor addressing issues of safety for children, 
parda for mothers in the village, and causing limited disruption to parents’ 
daily work schedules. 
 
‘Home Grown’ School (rural 
group only) 
Personal connection with the school because unlike the other competing LFP 
schools, it was owned and run by a villager. 
 
Higher Status Clientele 
(perceived) 
Socio-economic status and educational awareness of parents at the focus 
school thought to be higher than state schools. As there was no way for 
households to check this comparatively, and as data indicate that there was 
a large proportion of lower caste children at both schools, this is presented as 
a perceived characteristic. 
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Table 3 
Constraints Affecting School Choice as LFP Focus Schools 
 
Constraint Participant Articulations 
Financial Household income inadequate to meet high schooling costs given low 
income levels, family size, and competing needs 
 
Location of School Certain ‘ideal’ schools too far which would add to daily transport costs; 
distance of school too great to be deemed as a safe choice for children to 
navigate alone (more acute in rural group) 
 
Personal Relationship with 
Principal 
A sense of obligation to choose a school because of personal relationships 
with the principal and school management 
 
Additional School Expenses Too many ‘hidden’ costs of schooling: registration fees, exam fees, books 
and school supplies, school activity fees, uniforms, private tuition all which 
added increase financial input of schooling 
 
Child’s Choice Household compliance with child’s wish not to attend a particular school 
 
Fee Amounts and Collection 
Practices 
Higher fees, fewer concessions, and inflexible fee collection practices at 
‘ideal choice’ 
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Table 4 
Set of Rationales behind Employing the Strategy to Stay 
 
Rationale Explanation 
Curricular • Satisfied with children’s results 
• Housed all grades in the same school (KG through to grade 12) 
 
Cost • Affordable fees  
• ‘Flexi-fees’: flexible fee paying arrangements  
 
Experience • Have had enough experience of the school to assess its claims of ‘good 
schooling’ 
• Believe that school earned its reputation 
• Feel obliged to stay because of long association  
• Do not wish to disrupt children’s schooling 
 
School Management 
Practices 
• High level of school responsiveness 
• Enforcement of school calendar and timings 
• Strict with children 
 
Other School Related • Proximity 
• Satisfactory facilities 
 
Household Related • Family tradition 
• Children wanted to continue attending 
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Table 5 
Rationales for Employing the Strategy to Exit 
 
Rationale Elaboration 
Cost • Fees too high 
• Frequent demands for additional school activity fees 
• Perceive that quality of schooling is not comparable to fees charged (i.e. 
not getting ‘value for money’) 
 
Popularity • Notion that the school was not popular  
• Assumption that small class sizes indicated that the school was ‘not good’ 
because it was not bought into by many clients 
 
Facilities • Inadequate school facilities 
 
Curricular • Not satisfied with children’s results  
• Perception that not much schooling took place 
• Amount of English instruction 
 
School Management 
Practices &  School 
Administration Staff 
• Low level of school responsiveness 
• Lack of trust in the school management staff 
• Not much flexibility in fee payments 
 
Household Related • Relocated from rural to urban areas or neighbourhoods within the city 
• Child did not want to attend 
 
 
